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STATE OP NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EDWARD SAYAD, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15950 
SUBWAY-SURFACE SUPERVISORS ASSOCIATION, 
Respondent, 
-and-
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY, 
Employer. 
In the Matter of 
EDWARD SAYAD, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16150 
NEW YORK CITY TRANSIT AUTHORITY 
Respondent. 
CURTIS HARGER, ESQ., for Charging Party 
RICHARD DREYFUS, ESQ., for New York City Transit Authority 
STUART SALLES, ESQ., for Subway-Surface Supervisors 
Association 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
These cases come to us on exceptions filed by Edward Sayad 
to decisions by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing his charges against the 
Subway-Surface Supervisors Association (Association) and the 
New York City Transit Authority (Authority). Sayad alleges that 
Board - U-15950 and U-16150 -2 
the Association violated §209-a.2(a), (b) and (c) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). The charge against the 
Authority alleges violations of §209-a.l(a), (b), (c), (d) and 
(e) of the Act. Both charges arise out of the Authority's 
discipline of Sayad and his eventual discharge from employment. 
After several amendments and clarifications by Sayad, the 
Director dismissed both charges as deficient. The bargaining and 
bargaining-related allegations in each charge were dismissed for 
lack of standing. The remaining allegations against the 
Authority were dismissed by the Director because nothing in 
Sayad7s papers demonstrated that the Authority's discipline and 
ultimate discharge of Sayad stemmed from any exercise by him of 
rights protected by the Act. The remaining allegations against 
the Association were dismissed either as time barred or because 
they were wholly conclusory. 
Sayad filed timely exceptions raising specifically only 
arguments regarding timeliness. Thereafter, he sought an 
extension of time to obtain an attorney. His request was granted 
and, on May 25, 1995, the attorney whom he had retained requested 
an additional extension of time "to file arguments in support of 
the exceptions filed by Mr. Sayad". By letter of May 30, Sayad's 
attorney was given until June 19, 1995, to submit arguments in 
support of the exceptions. However, in the brief filed on 
June 19, 1995, Sayad's attorney .raised not only timeliness, but 
also arguments concerning the other grounds given for dismissal 
of the charges. Both the Association and the Authority objected 
Board - U-15950 and U-16150 -3 
to our consideration of these arguments on issues not raised in 
the exceptions and no request was made for an extension of time 
to file additional exceptions. 
Section 204.10 of our Rules of Procedure (Rules) allows a 
party to file exceptions within fifteen working days after that 
party's receipt of the decision in an improper practice charge. 
An extension of time to file exceptions may be requested.-' 
Although, after filing timely exceptions, Sayad requested and was 
granted an extension of time to obtain an attorney, his attorney 
then requested and was granted an extension of time to file 
arguments in support of the exceptions originally filed by Sayad, 
no extension of time for the filing of additional exceptions was 
requested and none was granted. We, therefore, decline to reach 
the other arguments delineated by Sayad's representative in his 
brief which do not relate to the exceptions as filed. 
Sayad alleges that the Association breached its duty of 
fair representation by allowing the Authority to process a 
disciplinary charge alleging several infractions as one charge 
instead of requiring the Authority to hear each infraction 
separately, and by not providing him with a copy of the 
Association-Authority collective bargaining agreement so he could 
ascertain his contractual rights for himself. Sayad last 
requested a copy of his contract, which he did not receive, from 
1ARules, §2 04.12. 
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the Association in March 1994. Sayad was served with the 
disciplinary charges on May 6, 1994.-1 
As to timeliness, Sayad asserts that because he received a 
notice of termination from the Authority on July 1, 1994, his 
time to file an improper practice charge against the Association 
alleging violations of the Act runs from that date and not from 
the dates on which the alleged improprieties actually occurred. 
In support of his exceptions, Sayad relies on this Board's 
decision in Middle Country Teachers Association fWerner),-7 
where we held: 
[A] party has standing to file an improper practice 
charge within four months after notification of a 
decision to perform an action alleged to be violative 
of the Act. The party may also await performance of 
the action and file an improper practice charge within 
four months after the intended action is actually 
implemented and the charging party is injured 
thereby. -' 
Sayad argues that because the Association could have provided him 
with a copy of the collective bargaining agreement and could have 
objected to the processing of all the alleged infractions in one 
disciplinary charge up to the date the letter of termination was 
issued on June 27, 1994, his time to file the charge runs from 
-''The charges list several instances occurring in March and 
April 1994, when Sayad reported late for work, was absent without 
leave, reported to the wrong location, refused a work assignment 
after reporting for duty and was insubordinate. The charges 
resulted in his immediate suspension for one month and, after a 
hearing held on May 25, 1994, his dismissal by letter dated 
June 27, 1994. 
5/21 PERB J3012 (1988) . 
^Id. at 3026. 
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that date, which he defines as the date he was injured by the 
Association's decision. We do not agree that June 27, 1994 is 
the date from which the four-month filing period should run. 
Sayad alleges that the Association failed to give him a copy of 
the collective bargaining agreement. He last requested, but did 
not receive a copy of the contract from the Association in March 
1994. His failure to file his charge within four months after he 
knew or should have known that his request had not been granted 
renders this aspect of the charge untimely.-1 The Director's 
dismissal of this aspect of the charge is accordingly affirmed. 
The allegation that the Association improperly failed to 
object to the processing of the several disciplinary charges as 
one charge was not dismissed by the Director as untimely filed; 
it was dismissed as being conclusory and not supported by any 
facts in the charge or amendments. As Sayad's exceptions are not 
addressed to the merits of the Director's dismissal decision, the 
merits dismissal is not properly before us for review. Were we 
to reach those merits, however, we would agree that Sayad's 
allegations are conclusory and devoid of any facts which would 
evidence that the Association's acquiescence to a single 
disciplinary hearing on the multiple disciplinary charges was 
arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith. 
Finally, it is clear from Sayad's original exceptions that 
what he actually wants by his charges and these exceptions is to 
^Citv of Yonkers, 7 PERB ^3 007 (1974). 
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have this agency review the merit of all the disciplinary charges 
that have been filed against him since at least 1991 up to the 
charges which led to his discharge from employment in 1994. 
Sayad believes that the disciplinary charges against him are 
false. The Act, however, simply does not empower us in a context 
such as this to investigate or decide whether disciplinary action 
against an employee is warranted. 
For the reasons set forth above, Sayad's exceptions are 
dismissed and the Director's decisions are affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charges must be, and they 
hereby are, dismissed. 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York 
%7tJ.-^ Ik . (\WA k 
Pauline R. Kinse l la , Chaii hairperson 
Eric J ./^Scnmertz, Member/ 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
EDNA BRAHAM, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-16958 
CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
LOCAL 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Respondent. 
EDNA BRAHAM, pro se 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Edna Braham to 
a decision by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) dismissing her charge that the Civil 
Service Employees Association, Inc., Local 1000, AFSCME, AFL-CIO 
(CSEA) violated §209-a.2(c) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act). 
Braham's charge alleges that, from 1992, when CSEA first 
approved legal assistance for her in pursuing a Title VII claim 
before the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and an 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) claim she had against 
her former employer, the State of New York, Unified Court System 
(UCS), alleging discrimination in job training and retaliatory 
discharge, to March 26, 1995, when she received a "consent to 
change attorney" stipulation from her CSEA-assigned counsel, she 
was not properly represented by CSEA and that CSEA violated the 
Board - U-16958 -2 
Act when it withdrew the legal assistance it had provided to her. 
Braham was advised that her charge was deficient because she had 
failed to provide specific facts in support of her allegations 
and also because the charge was untimely. In response, she filed 
an amendment on August 4, 1995. The Director thereafter 
dismissed her charge because it was untimely and because the 
pleaded facts and supporting documents failed to show that CSEA's 
conduct was arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith. 
Braham excepts to the Director's determination, alleging 
that she was in ill health and, therefore, could not file the 
improper practice charge in a timely fashion. She further 
alleges that she cooperated with CSEA's attorneys and a ruling in 
her favor in Federal District Court on one of her claims 
evidences that CSEA was arbitrary, discriminatory and acting in 
bad faith when it withdrew its legal assistance. CSEA supports 
the Director's decision. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's decision. 
Braham sought legal assistance from CSEA in 1992 in pursuing 
an age and race discrimination claim against UCS. CSEA approved 
legal assistance for her on July 2, 1992, and assigned the matter 
to one of its regional attorneys. Over the next two years, 
Braham had numerous disagreements with CSEA and its legal counsel 
about the processing of her claims. CSEA continued to represent 
her despite her allegations of misconduct to the Bar Association 
Disciplinary Committee about the conduct of her attorneys and her 
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numerous complaints to the EEOC, the U.S. Department of Justice 
and the Federal District Court Judge hearing her age 
discrimination claim. Finally, in November 1994, the assigned 
CSEA attorney requested the Judge to relieve him from 
representing Braham because Braham had recently filed a complaint 
about his representation of her with the Disciplinary Committee. 
The judge agreed to release him but requested that he first 
ascertain if CSEA could assign Braham other counsel, either from 
its legal staff or another regional attorney. On December 22, 
1994, CSEA sent a letter to Braham confirming that the judge had 
allowed the assigned CSEA regional counsel to withdraw as 
Braham's attorney because of the adversarial relationship between 
Braham and the attorney. CSEA informed Braham that, as it 
appeared that Braham was not satisfied with CSEA's service to 
her, despite its efforts on her behalf, that it would not assign 
another attorney to her case. She was advised to retain her own 
attorney, at her own expense. She apparently did so because on 
March 23, 1995, the CSEA attorney forwarded to her, at the 
request of her attorney, a "consent to change of attorney" 
stipulation for her to execute. Braham asserts that she received 
the letter on March 26, 1995. The improper practice charge was 
filed on July 26, 1995. 
PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules), §204.1(a)(1), require an 
improper practice charge to be filed within four months of the 
conduct which is alleged to be violative of the Act. The 
Director concluded that CSEA had decided to no longer represent 
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Braham and had so informed her on December 22, 1994, more than 
four months prior to the filing of the charge. We agree. The 
letter received on March 26, 1995 merely reiterated CSEA's 
initial decision and was done pursuant to a request from Braham's 
then attorney. It cannot serve to extend Braham's time to file a 
charge complaining about the withdrawal of legal assistance, 
which occurred on December 22, 1994.^ Therefore, Braham's 
charge^7 must be dismissed unless there is any merit to her 
other exceptions. 
Braham argues that because she was in ill health and had 
undergone several surgeries, she was unable to file the charge in 
a timely fashion. However, her supporting documents show only 
that she had surgery in November 1994 and February 1995 and 
received some follow-up care following both. She could have 
filed a charge alleging that CSEA was not properly representing 
her anytime from July 1992,^ when CSEA approved her request 
for legal assistance and began its representation of her, to 
April 22, 1995, four months after CSEA informed her that it would 
^See West Park Union Free Sch. Dist.. 11 PERB 13016 (1978). 
^Braham simultaneously filed an action in Civil Court of the 
City of New York, County of New York, Small Claims Part, alleging 
a breach of contract by CSEA in failing to represent her. By 
decision dated October 9, 1995, Judge Bransten dismissed the 
action, holding that the court was bound by the Director's 
determination that her improper practice charge was untimely and 
also on the basis that Braham had elected to proceed 
administratively before PERB and could not, therefore, seek to 
adjudicate an identical claim simultaneously in that court. 
Braham has appealed to the Appellate Division, First Department. 
^Braham alleges that CSEA first breached its duty of fair 
representation to her by secretly meeting on July 10, 1992 with 
an EEOC attorney to block the filing of her ADEA claim. 
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no longer represent her. That she was allegedly incapacitated 
from, at most, November 1994 to sometime after February 1995, 
cannot serve to extend her time to file an improper practice 
charge.^ 
As to Braham's remaining exceptions, we need not reach them 
based on our determination that the charge is untimely. 
For the foregoing reasons, Braham's exceptions are denied 
and the decision of the Director is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, CI hairperson 
^The filing deadlines set forth in our Rules may not be waived 
or disregarded. Board of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of the 
City of New York and UFT. 17 PERB 53099 (1984); Central Islip 
Public Schools, 6 PERB fl3063 (1973); Cattaraugus Co. Chapter of 
CSEA v. PERB. 3 PERB f7005 (Sup. Ct. Renss. Co. 1970). While we 
have extended the time to file exceptions in extenuating 
circumstances, our Rules specifically permit such an extension 
(Rules, §204.12). The Rules governing the filing of improper 
practice charges do not allow for a similar extension. (Rules, 
§204.1(a)(1)). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
MONROE BOCES #1 EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-15500 
MONROE BOCES #1, 
Respondent, 
-and-
MONROE #1 BOCES PARAEDUCATORS' 
(TEACHER AIDE) STEERING COMMITTEE, 
Intervenor. 
JAMES D. MATHEWS, for Charging Party 
HARRIS BEACH 6 WILCOX, LLP (JAMES A. SPITZ, JR. of 
counsel), for Respondent 
MARY WATTS, for Intervenor 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
Monroe BOCES #1 (BOCES) excepts to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge filed by the Monroe 
BOCES #1 Employees Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO 
(Association). The Association alleges that BOCES dominated, 
interfered with, and supported the Monroe #1 BOCES Paraeducators' 
(Teacher Aide) Steering Committee (Committee) in violation of 
§209-a.l(a) and (b) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). Relying upon the National Labor Relations Board's (NLRB) 
Board - U-15500 -2 
analysis in Electromation. Inc.-7 of similar issues under the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), the ALJ, after a hearing, 
held that the Committee is an employee organization within the 
meaning of the Act27 and that BOCES had improperly dominated, 
interfered with, and supported the Committee. The ALJ ordered 
that the Committee be disbanded and that BOCES cease all 
participation in or support of the Committee. 
BOCES argues in its exceptions that the charge is not 
timely, that it did not violate the Act because it did not intend 
to interfere with its employees7 right to form, join or 
participate in an employee organization, that the language, 
purpose and policies of the Act render Electromation inapplicable 
or unpersuasive in the public sector, and that the ALJ's bias 
against it prevented it from presenting an effective defense to 
the charge. BOCES also objects to the ordered disestablishment 
of the Committee as contrary to law and policy. 
The Committee, which also filed exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision, argues that the ALJ misinterpreted or omitted material 
facts and that the ALJ favored the Association over it during the 
hearings. 
^309 NLRB 990, 142 LRRM 1001 (1992), enf'd. 35 F.3d 1148, 147 
LRRM 2257 (7th Cir. 1994). 
^An employee organization is defined in §201.5 of the Act as "an 
organization of any kind having as its primary purpose the 
improvement of terms and conditions of employment of public 
employees." 
Board - U-15500 -3 
The Association, in urging that we affirm the ALJ's 
decision, argues that BOCES' exceptions are without merit, that 
the ALJ's decision is correct on the facts and law, and that her 
conduct of the hearing was unbiased. It argues also that the 
Committee's exceptions are untimely and otherwise not in 
compliance with our Rules of Procedure (Rules) and that many of 
the representations of fact in the Committee's exceptions are 
inaccurate or immaterial.-'' 
Having reviewed the record and having considered the 
parties' arguments, including those at oral argument, we affirm 
the ALJ's decision. In reviewing the ALJ's decision, we have 
limited our discussion to BOCES' exceptions. The Committee's 
exceptions were not timely filed^ and, given the Association's 
objection to those exceptions, we may not consider them. 
We treat first with BOCES' exceptions which are not directed 
to the ALJ's disposition on the merits. 
^The Committee has filed a response to what it characterizes as 
the Association's cross-exceptions. The Association did not, 
however, file exceptions or cross-exceptions to the ALJ's 
decision; it merely responded to the Committee's exceptions. 
Section 204.11 of our Rules does not permit a reply to a response 
unless "requested by the board or filed with the board's 
authorization". We neither requested nor approved the 
Committee's reply to the Association's papers. Therefore, we 
have not considered it on this appeal. 
^The lay representative for the Committee apparently assumed, 
incorrectly, that the extension of time afforded BOCES to file 
its exceptions was equally applicable to the Committee. In any 
event, the Committee's exceptions parallel BOCES' exceptions in 
certain respects, are not material to the disposition of this 
case, or have been rendered academic by our examination of the 
record. 
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BOCES argues that the ALJ was biased in favor of the 
Association and that her bias prejudiced its defense of the 
charge. We have carefully reviewed the record in this regard and 
conclude that it does not establish bias against BOCES or 
favoritism toward the Association. The AU's rulings and conduct 
of the hearing neither deprived BOCES of a reasonable opportunity 
to present its defenses or to make a fair record upon which to 
assess the merits of the Association's allegations against it. 
Quite the contrary, the record is voluminous and the facts 
reflected therein, many within the large number of documents in 
evidence, are undisputed in material respects. The ALJ's limited 
questioning of certain witnesses during the hearing was for the 
permissible purpose of clarification of testimony or documents or 
to facilitate rulings regarding the admissibility of evidence.^ 
We consider next BOCES' argument that the charge is 
untimely. The Association filed a petition on February 7, 1994, 
to represent all of BOCES' full-time and part-time teacher aides 
and master teacher aides. On March 16, 1994, the Committee moved 
to intervene in that representation proceeding. In response to 
that motion, the Association filed this charge on March 31, 1994. 
BOCES argues that the charge is untimely because the 
Association allegedly knew by March 1993, at the latest, of the 
acts alleged by the Association to constitute BOCES' domination, 
interference or support of the Committee. The ALJ held the 
^Compare Canandaiqua City Sch. Dist.. 27 PERB f3046 (1994). 
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charge to have been timely filed because BOCES' domination, 
interference, and support of the Committee was "continuing" to at 
least March 1994. 
A charge is clearly timely if filed within four months of 
the date a charging party knows or should have known an improper 
practice has been committed. In relevant context, there are two 
elements in the improper practices alleged. BOCES' actions 
vis-a-vis the Committee must constitute unlawful domination, 
interference, or support and the Committee must be an employee 
organization within the meaning of the Act. It is not improper 
for a public employer to dominate, interfere with, or support an 
organization other than an employee organization as defined in 
the Act. An essential inquiry in determining whether the charge 
is timely, therefore, is when the Association had actual or 
constructive knowledge that the Committee is an employee 
organization. We find on this record that the Association did 
not have reason to believe the Committee was an employee 
organization until it moved to intervene in the representation 
proceeding and thereby professed for the first time to be one.^ 
That date marks the earliest from which the four-month filing 
period runs and the charge is plainly timely when measured from 
that date. 
^Only an employee organization as defined in the Act may 
intervene in a representation proceeding to seek certification as 
the exclusive bargaining agent for a unit. 
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Our finding that the charge is timely is fully consistent 
with BOCES' own view of the Committee. Although BOCES has not 
taken an exception to the AKT's finding that the Committee is an 
employee organization, the record shows that BOCES did not 
consider the Committee to be an employee organization until the 
Committee moved to intervene in the representation case. Its 
prior belief that the Committee was not an employee organization 
is still central to its rationale in defense of the charge on the 
merits. If BOCES did not consider the Committee to be an 
employee organization until it intervened in the representation 
proceeding, BOCES cannot fairly and reasonably expect us to 
charge the Association with the very knowledge BOCES denies. 
Having held the charge timely on this basis, we have no occasion 
to decide whether it is timely on the theory advanced by the ALJ 
or any other. 
Turning to the merits, §209-a.l(b) of the Act makes it 
improper for a "public employer or its agents deliberately to 
dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any 
employee organization for the purpose of depriving [public 
employees] of [their rights guaranteed in section two hundred 
two]."^ The remaining exceptions require us to consider for 
one of the few times in our history what the Legislature intended 
to prohibit by §209-a.l(b) of the Act. The infrequency with 
^Section 202 of the Act grants public employees the right to 
form, join and participate in an employee organization of their 
own choosing or to refrain from those activities. 
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which union domination allegations have been brought to our 
attention has not, however, deprived us of a clear framework for 
analysis of the questions presented in this case. 
The Board's first consideration in any detail of the purpose 
of §209-a.l(b) was in Board of Education of the City School 
District of the City of Albany**7 (hereafter Albany). There, the 
Board stated generally that the Legislature, absent any 
indication to the contrary, "sought to identify with comparable 
sections of the National Labor Relations Act . . . ."^ Section 
209-a.l(b) of the Act was an "attempt by the Legislature to 
emulate the structures of §8(a)(2) of the National Labor 
Relations Act" and "the purport of subsection 209-a.l(b) was to 
proscribe employer domination of an employee organization or the 
grant of unlawful assistance or support to an employee 
organization."^ 
Several years later, in County of Rockland and Rockland 
County Community College^7 (hereafter Rockland), the Board 
again noted that §209-a.l(b) of the Act parallels §8(a)(2) of the 
NLRA and that the former is "designed to prevent a public 
&6 PERB 53012 (1973). 
^Id. at 3031. 
^Id. 
^13 PERB 13089 (1980) . 
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employer from meddling in the internal affairs of the 
organization or trying to control it."^ 
The Board in County of Onondaga and County of Onondaga 
Sheriff.^ stated that the prohibition in §209-a.l(b) of the 
Act "is directed to conduct by a public employer which would 
compromise the independence of an employee organization that 
represents or seeks to represent its employees."^ 
It is clear from Albany and Rockland that the A U did not 
err by looking to the NLRB's decision in Electromation for 
guidance in the interpretation and application of §209-a.l(b). 
BOCES' exception, however, is not so much that the ALJ erred by 
borrowing from the NLRB's analysis in Electromation. but that she 
wrongly adopted Electromation "wholesale" and thereby ignored 
both the language and policies of the Act. BOCES' arguments in 
this regard, however, do not persuade us that an analysis or 
result different from that by the majority in Electromation is 
warranted in this case. Electromation is fully in accord with 
the language and policies of the Act. 
BOCES argues that as a matter of law and policy a violation 
of §209-a.l(b) of the Act necessitates proof that the employer 
actually intended to interfere with its employees' right to form, 
join or participate in an employee organization. Domination, 
^Id. at 3143. 
^14 PERB ^3029 (1981) . 
^Id. at 3051. 
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interference, or support in fact without scienter cannot, on the 
District's reading of §209-a.l(b), violate that subsection of the 
Act. 
For this argument, BOCES relies on the language in both 
§209-a.l(a) and (b) which requires that the employer's action be 
taken "for the purpose of depriving" public employees of their 
statutorily protected rights. As BOCES itself notes, however, we 
have long considered that the motive element in these improper 
practices is satisfied in those circumstances in which the 
employer's actions necessarily have the effect of interfering 
with employees' fundamental statutory rights.^ Therefore, the 
NLRB's statement in Electromation that a violation of §8(a)(2) of 
the NLRA does not require a finding of antiunion animus or a 
specific motive to interfere with employee rights is entirely 
consistent with §209-a.l(b) as written and applied. 
We are also not persuaded that the Act's purposes and 
policies require that a specific motive to dominate, interfere 
with, or support an employee organization be established to 
sustain a violation of §209-a.l(a) and (b) in the context of 
cases such as this one. In making this policy argument, BOCES 
argues that Electromation was written against an already existing 
and controlling body of case law and legislative history which 
^Hudson Valley Community Coll.. 18 PERB 13057 (1985); State of 
New York, 10 PERB f3108 (1977). 
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restricted the NLRB's application of §8(a)(2) of the NLRA, 
restrictions not equally present under the Act. 
Although it is certainly true that we write on a cleaner 
slate than did the NLRB, we do not accept BOCES' premise that the 
purposes and policies of the Act are an invitation to us to be 
less vigilant in the protection of public employees against 
employee organizations which are dominated in fact by a public 
employer. We simply do not agree with BOCES' representation that 
the Legislature's declared policy to promote harmonious and 
cooperative labor relationships would be advanced by engrafting a 
specific motive requirement unto §209-a.l(b) violations. 
BOCES' policy-based interpretation of §209-a.l(b) would 
leave intact employee organizations which are in fact dominated, 
interfered with, or supported by public employers unless it could 
be proven that the domination, interference, or support were 
extended for the specific purpose of depriving employees of 
statutory rights. Section 209-a.l(b), however, addresses the 
damage inflicted upon employees by an employer's domination, 
interference, or support of an employee organization and an 
employer's subjective intent to violate the Act is wholly 
unrelated to the damage sought to be avoided. The Legislature 
believed and declared that all of the policies of the Act would 
be best effectuated in a labor relations system under which 
employees, through a bargaining agent of their free choice, were 
given a right to negotiate collectively with their employer 
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regarding their terms and conditions of employment. Those 
fundamental rights are illusory at best if the employees' 
bargaining agent is in fact controlled by their employer, and the 
harm to those rights is always present apart from an employer's 
specific intent to violate the Act. Dominated unions are 
coercive by their very nature whether the employer intends them 
to be or whether the employees perceive them to be because they 
necessarily preclude the free exercise of the right to organize 
for purposes of collective negotiation. Therefore, the policy 
considerations prompting New York's prohibition of employee 
organizations which are dominated, interfered with, or supported 
by a public employer are exactly the same as those driving the 
comparable prohibition in the private sector. 
BOCES argues also that the Committee's purposes and 
functions are consistent with policies outside of the Act's own, 
which favor communication systems "utilizing input from all 
groups affected by the decision-making process", citing Education 
Department regulations requiring shared decision-making in public 
schools. There are several short answers to BOCES' arguments in 
this regard. First, the Committee has never been part of the 
system of shared decision-making established by the Commissioner 
of Education. Second, any system of shared decision-making 
cannot operate in violation of the Act or any other laws. Third, 
BOCES' arguments in this respect are best addressed in the 
context of the facts of the particular case rather than as a 
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general policy-based interpretation of the Act's improper 
practice provisions. Our conclusion that the Committee is an 
employer-dominated employee organization is based upon the 
totality of evidence in the record before us in this case. We 
make no findings as to whether other systems of employee 
participation would violate the Act.^7 
The remaining issue is whether BOCES' actions constitute 
unlawful domination, interference, or support of the Committee. 
Having affirmed the ALJ's finding that the Committee is 
dominated, we fashion our analysis in that context with the 
understanding that the domination finding subsumes the lesser-
included allegations of support and interference. 
Electromation. and the cases arising under the NLRA before 
and after that case, stand for the general proposition that a 
union is dominated when the impetus behind the formation of the 
organization emanates from the employer and the employee 
organization has no effective existence independent of the 
employer's active involvement. We find this standard equally 
useful in the interpretation of §209-a.l(b) of the Act because, 
for many of the reasons previously stated, there is simply 
nothing in the language or the policies of the Act which would 
^We note, however, that there are undoubtedly many ways to 
obtain employee input without violating the Act, both within and 
without a unionized workplace. Electromation and E.I. duPont & 
Co.. 311 NLRB 893, 143 LRRM 1268 (1993), mention several which 
have equal viability in the public sector. 
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establish that the Legislature intended some other standard to 
apply. 
There are several indicia of employer domination and many of 
them are present in this case. As previously stated, however, 
our decision is based on the totality of circumstances in this 
case and we express no opinion as to whether any of the facts 
upon which we rely would, in isolation, constitute unlawful 
domination, interference or support. 
As found by the ALJ, the Committee evolved from a salary 
schedule and career ladder committee formed at the specific 
suggestion of John Campolieto, BOCES Assistant Superintendent for 
Special Education. Campolieto is admittedly an exempt managerial 
employee under the Act. Throughout the Committee's existence, 
under each of its several different names, Campolieto and other 
managerial,^ administrative and supervisory personnel have 
been members of and/or active participants in the Committee's 
affairs. Campolieto, in particular, is clearly a person with 
influence over the Committee, making proposals or effective 
recommendations regarding terms and conditions of employment and 
providing the Committee with information to facilitate their 
discussions and otherwise "advising" the Committee. The conduct 
^Section 214 of the Act forbids managerial employees from 
holding office or membership in an employee organization which is 
or seeks to become certified or recognized as the bargaining 
agent for employees. This section of the Act is intended, in 
part, to help ensure that an employee organization is and remains 
independent from a public employer. 
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and character of the Committee's discussions and exchanges of 
proposals with the BOCES have been marked frequently by an 
uncustomary sensitivity to BOCES7 interests, with Campolieto, for 
example, at one point recommending to the Committee that it 
"strive to propose budget recommendations that are sensible, 
reasonable, rational and affordable". The budget recommendations 
adopted by BOCES, as applicable to the aides' terms and 
conditions of employment, are set forth in policy "reports" or 
"handbooks". Mary Watts, a teacher aide, is the BOCES-appointed 
liaison between the Committee and BOCES. Under her unofficial 
"liaison" title, Watts is the person who is most responsible for 
the direction and control of the Committee. Her functions within 
and on behalf of the Committee are effectively her primary job 
with BOCES for which BOCES pays her a 30% premium above her base 
salary as a teacher aide. Her immediate supervisor is 
Campolieto. Watts and Campolieto, singly or in combination, 
control the exchange of Committee proposals between the 
Committee, BOCES' Superintendent, and its governing body. As 
Committee liaison, Watts actively discouraged employees' 
involvement with the Association and she actively encouraged 
their membership and participation in the Committee. BOCES, 
moreover, contributes financial and other substantial support to 
the Committee, such as meeting space, use of equipment and mail 
privileges while not extending similar privileges to the 
Association and its members or advocates. 
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Campolieto is clearly BOCES7 agent for purposes of 
§209-a.l(a) and (b), and, as Watts' Committee liaison activities 
are effectively, albeit unofficially, a major part of her 
employment relationship, Watts is equally BOCES' agent for these 
purposes, whether or not she is supervisory or confidential as 
the Association alleges. Campolieto's and Watts' active 
participation in the Committee placed BOCES in a position by 
which it could and did shape the Committee's functions, 
discussions and decisions. 
In sum, the totality of the record evidence persuades us 
that the Committee simply does not have a viable existence 
independent of BOCES' active involvement therein. Its formation, 
reformation and administration over time have been dominated by 
the membership, participation and control of agents of BOCES. So 
complete is that control that BOCES admits in its answer to the 
charge that the Committee is "part of the organized structure" of 
BOCES. Although it attempted to distinguish the "Steering 
Committee", which is admittedly part of its structure, from the 
"Committee", which moved to intervene in the representation 
proceeding, it is one and the same organization which has existed 
under several different names. It is not an accurate reflection 
of the record to treat what is one committee as if it were two 
separate, distinct entities for purposes of our analysis. 
Having held the Committee to be dominated in violation of 
§209-a.l(a) and (b) of the Act, the ALJ's disestablishment order 
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is clearly necessary and appropriate. We have, however, deleted 
that part of the ALJ's recommended order requiring BOCES to cease 
its participation in or support of the Committee because the 
disestablishment order renders the other part redundant of and 
arguably contradictory to the disestablishment. 
For the reasons set forth above, BOCES' exceptions are 
denied, the Committee's exceptions are dismissed, and the ALJ's 
decision is affirmed. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that BOCES: 
1. Immediately disestablish the Committee.^ 
2. Sign and post the attached notice at all locations 
normally used to post notices of information to teacher 
aides and master teacher aides. 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Cha irperson 
Eric y. Schmertz, Memb 
^Our order is intended to cover the Committee under any and all 
of its former or current names. 
NOTICE TO ALL EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all teacher aides and master teacher aides employed by the Monroe BOCES #1 (BOCES) that: 
1. BOCES will immediately disestablish the Monroe #1 BOCES Paraeducators' (Teacher Aide) 
Steering Committee. 
Dated By . 
(Representative) (Title) 
MONROE BOCES #1 
is Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days 
by any other material. 
from the date of posting, and must not be altered, defaced, or covered 
2D-11/29/95 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GEORGE DEVITO, PRESIDENT OF THE RYE 
POLICE ASSOCIATION, INC., and RYE POLICE 
ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Parties, 
-and- CASE NO. U-14499 
CITY OF RYE, 
Respondent. 
WOLIN & WOLIN (ALAN E. WOLIN of counsel), for Charging 
Parties 
VINCENT TOOMEY, ESQ., for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by George DeVito, 
President of the Rye Police Association Inc., and the Rye Police 
Association, Inc. (together, the Association) to a decision of 
the Assistant Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Assistant Director) dismissing their charge, 
which alleges that the City of Rye (City) violated §209-a.l(a) of 
the Public Employees7 Fair Employment Act (Act) when it precluded 
DeVito from working overtime and swapping tours of duty because 
he had engaged in activities protected by the Act. 
The Assistant Director determined that, although DeVito had 
engaged in protected activities, the City's Commissioner of 
Police, Anthony J. Schembri, had no knowledge of those activities 
and he was not improperly motivated when he issued the memorandum 
that prevented DeVito's overtime and tour swapping. 
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The Association excepts to the Assistant Director's 
decision, arguing that the timing of the memorandum is suspect, 
that Schembri must have known about DeVito's activities because 
of the small size of the police department, that the reasons 
given by the City for its decision to restrict DeVito's 
eligibility for overtime and tour swapping are pretextual, and 
that DeVito received disparate treatment because of his protected 
activities. The City supports the Assistant Director's decision. 
The Assistant Director made the following findings. In 
January 1993, Sergeant Robert Falk became the administrative 
sergeant for the patrol division of the City's police 
department.^ Falk's title is included in the Association's 
bargaining unit. One of his responsibilities is to monitor 
attendance and to track sick leave use and overtime expenses. He 
met with Schembri weekly, usually on Mondays, to discuss these 
and other issues. At the end of January, he reported to Schembri 
that DeVito had charged absences to sick leave seven times and 
had been available to work overtime nine times. He and Schembri 
discussed concerns about the department's use of sick leave and 
overtime costs due to the City's worsening financial condition at 
that time. It was decided that Falk would continue to monitor 
these areas and report back to Schembri. In late February, Falk 
reported that DeVito had utilized four sick days and had worked 
overtime nine times during the month of February. Falk and 
^In August 1993, he became a patrol lieutenant, also a unit 
position, with essentially the same duties. 
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Schembri discussed the fact that DeVito was out sick many times, 
but that he still seemed able to work overtime whenever he was 
called. Falk reminded Schembri of an incident in 1990 involving 
another sergeant where Schembri had denied that officer 
permission to work overtime or second jobs because of his 
excessive use of sick leave.^ While they discussed imposing 
the same penalty on DeVito, Falk suggested that he would monitor 
the sick leave closely for some more time and that, in any event, 
DeVito had already arranged some swaps for the coming weeks, 
which Falk and Schembri did not want to disturb because they 
impacted on DeVito's and other sergeants' vacation plans. 
On March 3, DeVito called in sick for his scheduled midnight 
to 8:00 a.m. shift but he was at work that afternoon to work the 
4:00 p.m. to midnight shift he had swapped with another 
sergeant.^ Falk, aware of the situation, brought it to 
Schembri's attention on March 3 or 4, 1993. Schembri agreed with 
Falk's suggestion to deny DeVito the opportunity to work overtime 
or to swap shifts until his sick leave use improved. Immediately 
^The sergeant had used 24 days of sick leave in a 10-month 
period, while continuing to work overtime. His right to work 
overtime and second jobs was restricted for approximately three 
weeks, during which time he had no absences charged to sick 
leave. The officer grieved Schembri's action and the matter was 
settled at arbitration. 
^The collective bargaining agreement between the Association and 
the City provides that a police officer should not work overtime 
within 24 hours of a shift for which he or she has called in 
sick. 
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following the meeting on March 3 or 4, Schembri prepared a 
memorandum to DeVito,V which stated, in relevant part: 
As of March 1, you have taken 12 days of sick leave 
from the beginning of this year. You have also made 
many swaps and on one occasion, called out sick on a 
midnight tour and came in 4-12 for another officer. 
This sick leave is unacceptable. Your fundamental 
responsibility is to be at your job when you are 
scheduled. Paying proper attention to your health by 
making sure that outside activities don't interfere 
with your ability to come to work is of primary 
importance. I understand you have made plans to be 
with your family. I do not want to interfere with 
that. Therefore, effective immediately, until your 
sick leave is improved, you are ineligible for overtime 
and your permission to swap is rescinded effective 
April 2, 1993. 
The memo was not delivered to DeVito immediately because he 
had scheduled several swaps with other sergeants and Schembri 
and Falk did not want to penalize them by disrupting their 
vacation plans. Falk gave the memorandum to a desk officer on 
the 4:00 p.m. to midnight shift on March 9 to deliver to DeVito 
when he reported for his scheduled midnight to 8:00 a.m. shift on 
March 10. DeVito received the memorandum, dated March 10, 1993, 
sometime on March 10 or 11, 1993.^ 
Based upon our review of the record and the credibility 
determinations of the Assistant Director, the foregoing facts, 
^Schembri testified that he called the city Manager and 
Corporation Counsel on March 3 or 4 to read to them the 
memorandum he had prepared and discuss the sanctions he was 
imposing on DeVito. 
^DeVito was not sure whether he worked his scheduled shifts on 
March 10 or March 11, 1993. 
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which are essentially uncontroverted, are confirmed and we affirm 
the Assistant Director's decision. 
The Association points to three instances of DeVito's 
exercise of protected rights immediately preceding the issuance 
of the March 10 memorandum.-7 In February 1993, the Association 
filed with PERB a petition for compulsory interest arbitration 
and served a copy of the petition on the City's labor counsel, 
but not on Schembri. There is no evidence in the record that 
Schembri knew about the petition.^ 
On March 2, 1993, the Association's counsel sent a letter 
to the City Manager complaining about Schembri allegedly having 
made accusations of racism against DeVito and another police 
officer. Again, Schembri was not copied on the letter and there 
is no record evidence that he was aware of it at any time 
relevant to the inquiry herein. 
Finally, on March 9, 1993, DeVito wrote a letter to Schembri 
requesting the scheduling of a staff meeting on behalf of all 
members of the police department. The letter alleged that 
Schembri had ignored prior requests for meetings and that he was 
having a negative effect on the department because of his 
interest in employment elsewhere. DeVito could not recall how or 
^The Association relies in its charge only on these three 
activities as motivating Schembri's action, not DeVito's position 
as Association president, of which Schembri was well aware. 
^Schembri testified, and the Assistant Director found, that he 
had no knowledge of the petition or the arbitration proceeding 
and that he had no involvement in labor relations, leaving that 
to the City's labor counsel. 
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when the letter was sent to Schembri. On March 10, 1993, an 
article appeared in a local newspaper, quoting portions of 
DeVito's letter and also quoting Schembri's reaction to DeVito's 
accusations. However, there is no evidence in the record that 
Schembri was aware of DeVito's letter before he had the 
memorandum dated March 10 prepared and delivered to DeVito. 
To establish a violation of §209-a.l(a) of the Act, DeVito 
and the Association must establish that DeVito was engaged in 
protected activities and that the City had knowledge of and acted 
because of those activities.& Assuming that DeVito's 
activities were protected under the Act, the Assistant Director 
determined that the Association had failed to establish that 
Schembri was aware of those activities and, therefore, it failed 
to prove that the March 10 memorandum was issued because of those 
activities. We agree. 
The record does not establish that Schembri had knowledge of 
DeVito's activities before the decision was made on March 3 or 4 
to restrict his overtime and tour swapping privileges. Although 
the Association claims that the memorandum delivered to the desk 
sergeant at or around 4:00 p.m. on March 9 for delivery to DeVito 
at the start of his shift at midnight on March 10, was prepared 
after Schembri became aware of DeVito's March 9 letter, the 
direct evidence is to the contrary. The Association points to 
the timing of DeVito's March 9 letter to Schembri and the 
newspaper article of March 10 to establish that the memorandum 
^Citv of Salamanca. 18 PERB 53012 (1985). 
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dated March 10 was improperly motivated. Although the March 10 
memorandum was dated the same day as the newspaper article 
quoting DeVito's March 9 letter to Schembri, there is no record 
evidence to contradict Schembri's credited testimony that he 
decided to curtail DeVito's overtime and tour swapping on March 3 
or 4, 1994. Further, Falk and Schembri credibly testified that 
the memorandum had been prepared right after their meeting on 
March 3 or 4 and was not delivered to DeVito until March 10 
because that was the first day shift he worked and on which he 
had not swapped tours with any other sergeants. 
The Association also cites to the "small plant doctrine", 
articulated by the National Labor Relations Board and adopted by 
us,27 as support for a finding that Schembri, because of the 
small size of the police department, must have known of DeVito's 
protected activities. The Association has, however, misapplied 
the doctrine. At best, the small plant doctrine permits an 
inference of knowledge to be drawn from the record as a whole^ 
in circumstances showing that union activities "were carried on 
in such a manner, or at times that in the normal course of events 
the respondent must have noticed them."^ The small plant 
doctrine only applies when there is no credible record evidence 
regarding a respondent's actual knowledge of protected 
^Town of Rochester. 12 PERB ^3078, aff'q 12 PERB f4501 (1979). 
l^See Coral Gables Convalescent Home. 97 LRRM 1435, 1436 (1978). 
^Hadley Mfg. Corp.. 108 NLRB 1641, 1650, 34 LRRM 1246, 1248 
(1954). 
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activities. Here, there is direct record evidence that Schembri 
did not know about the three specific activities in which DeVito 
was engaged. It is, therefore, inappropriate to infer from 
application of the small plant doctrine any knowledge on the part 
of Schembri of DeVito's union activities.—'' 
Finally, the evidence does not support the Association's 
argument that DeVito was subjected to disparate treatment for his 
use of sick leave. Another officer had previously been deprived 
of overtime privileges for excessive use of sick leave. That the 
circumstance of DeVito and the. qther sergeant differed somewhat 
and that DeVito's loss of overtime privileges was for a longer 
period does not, by itself, or with the other record evidence, 
establish that Schembri's decision with respect to DeVito was 
improperly motivated. 
Based on the above, the Association's exceptions are denied 
and the decision of the Assistant Director is affirmed.—7 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York %£ y\£{ \ \ A 
Pauline R. Kmsella, Chairperson 
Eric Jj/Schmertz, Member 
^Citv of Corning, 17 PERB [^3022 (1984) . 
—
7We need not reach the other exceptions raised by the 
Association because of our determination that Schembri did not 
know of DeVito's activities. 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
GENERAL BROWN TEACHERS' ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. CP-350 
GENERAL BROWN CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
WILLIAM L. CURTIS, for Petitioner 
STEVEN J. JOHNSON, for Employer 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the General 
Brown Central School District to a decision by the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) on a 
unit clarification/placement petition filed by the General Brown 
Teachers' Association (Association). The Association seeks a 
determination that the newly created position of Teacher 
Assistant/District Computer Coordinator (TA/Coordinator) is in or 
should be placed into its existing instructional unit. After a 
hearing, the Director dismissed the clarification aspect of the 
petition because the Association's unit as defined did not 
include the TA/Coordinator position. The Director, however, 
placed the title into the Association's unit on a finding that 
the TA/Coordinator, as an allied professional position, had a 
greater community of interest with the District's professional, 
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certificated personnel than it did with either the District's 
administrators or its noninstructional personnel. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the placement 
aspect of the petition should have been dismissed pursuant to its 
motion at the hearing because the Association did not satisfy its 
burden of proof on the issue of community of interest. It argues 
also that the Director's decision to place the title into the 
Association's unit is not required under our decisions and is 
actually inconsistent with two of the Director's earlier 
decisions involving coordinator titles. The Association has not 
filed a response to the District's exceptions. 
Having reviewed the record and having considered the 
arguments presented, we affirm the Director's decision. 
The District relies upon our decision in County of 
Niagara^ to support its argument regarding the motion to 
dismiss the unit placement petition. County of Niagara, however, 
involved a unit clarification petition only, which we dismissed 
because there was insufficient evidence that the title there in 
issue was in fact included in the petitioner's unit. A unit 
placement petition^ is, in substance and effect, a mini 
representation proceeding calling only for a nonadversarial 
investigation and the application of the statutory uniting 
^21 PERB f3030 (1988). 
^The differences in the two types of petitions were detailed by 
us in State of New York (Dep't of Audit and Control) , 24 PERB 
53019 (1991). 
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criteria in §207.1 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). Therefore, the Director properly completed his 
investigation of the unit placement petition notwithstanding the 
District's motion to dismiss. 
On the merits, the District argues that the Director decided 
to place the TA/Coordinator title into the Association's unit 
partly because the union representing the noninstructional 
personnel did not want to represent that title. As we read the 
Director's decision, however, he merely noted the other union's 
position with respect to the Association's petition, but he did 
not rely upon that as a factor in making the placement. 
The District also argues that the unit placement which was 
ordered was not required by any of our decisions. The question 
on this appeal, however, is not whether the unit placement is 
compelled by any of our decisions, but whether it is consistent 
with those decisions. Our decision in Wappinqers Central School 
District^ may not, as the District argues, be dispositive in 
favor of the Director's decision. That observation, however, 
does not make that case irrelevant nor does the Director's 
citation^7 to it make his decision incorrect. The District's 
assertion that the Director's decision is inconsistent with his 
own earlier decisions is, however, clearly relevant. The 
5/28 PERB f3037 (1995) . 
^The Director cited to Wappinqers Cent. Sch. Dist. only in 
reference to a statement that the placement would not defeat the 
District's interests and expectations regarding utilization of 
the TA/Coordinator position, a point we discuss infra. 
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Director did not refer in his decision to the cases which the 
District argues are inconsistent with the unit placement he 
ordered. An unexplained departure from controlling precedent is 
at least arguably arbitrary.^ Having reviewed the cases cited 
by the District, however, we do not find them to be inconsistent 
with the Director's decision in this case. 
The District's inconsistency argument is centered on the 
belief that the Director's earlier decisions created a per se 
uniting rule for coordinator positions. Uniting, however, rarely 
lends itself to a per se approach with respect to any position. 
Rather, for most positions, the appropriate unit determination 
rests on a careful analysis of all material facts, including 
existing unit structures and size of workforce, followed by an 
application of the Act's several uniting criteria in light of its 
overall purposes and policies. Many representation cases will 
present issues and facts which are or appear to be similar in at 
least certain respects. The unit determinations in these cases 
will often depend on subtle distinctions in those facts, 
differences often more of degree than substance. The analysis 
made by the Director in this case is consistent with this factual 
approach, one he also used in the cases cited by the District and 
discussed next. 
^Matter of Charles A. Field Delivery Service. Inc. (Roberts). 66 
N.Y.2d 516 (1985); Uniondale Union Free Sch. Dist. v. PERB, 
140 A.D.2d 612, 21 PERB 57012 (2d Dep't 1988)(subsequent history 
omitted). 
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In Wayne-Finger Lakes BOCES
 r& the Director declined to add 
a Coordinator of Computer Training and many other titles to a 
teachers unit on a finding that the excluded titles all had an 
insufficient community of interest with the unit positions. The 
excluded titles had little or no student contact, did not have 
common supervision and they had duties different from the unit 
employees. 
In Albany-Schoharie-Schenectady BOCES JJ the Director 
declined to place the coordinators of three programs into a 
teachers unit, instead concluding that the coordinators had a 
much stronger community of interest with nonunit program 
associates. None of the coordinators were certified or licensed, 
they did not work within a traditional school setting, they had 
terms and conditions of employment substantially different from 
unit employees and their placement could have been 
administratively inconvenient for the employer because placement 
was believed to have presented potential difficulties regarding 
their availability during the summer. 
The unit determinations in both of those cases were made on 
the particular facts of each case. Having excluded certain 
coordinators from teachers units in Wayne-Finger Lakes BOCES and 
Albany-Schoharie-Schenectadv BOCES does not mean that an 
exclusion of the TA/Coordinator in this case was required or 
^26 PERB 54056 (1993). 
1J21 PERB 54049 (1994) . 
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warranted. In this case, the Director concluded, and the record 
supports, that the TA/Coordinator is appropriately placed into 
the teachers unit. Although recognizing that the TA/Coordinator 
has some interests in common with both the District's 
administrators and its noninstructional personnel, the Director 
concluded that the title had a greater community of interest with 
the professional employees in the Association's unit. Most 
significantly to the Director and to us, the TA/Coordinator 
position requires certification under the Education Law and the 
Commissioner's regulations and it has a substantial instructional 
component involving interaction with teachers and pupils, factors 
not similarly present in Wavne-Finaer Lakes BOCES or Albany-
Schoharie-Schenectady BOCES. 
Moreover, the placement does not present on this record any 
supervisory or other conflicts of interest. In that regard, the 
District argues that placement of the TA/Coordinator position 
into the teachers unit will prevent it from using the position as 
it contemplated. This argument is also based on an incorrect 
assumption that upon placement of the TA/Coordinator into the 
teachers unit, the incumbent will automatically and necessarily 
be governed by all of the contract terms covering those already 
in the unit.57 Therefore, there is no basis to conclude, for 
example, that the twelve-month TA/Coordinator position will 
^Onondaqa-Cortland-Madison BOCESf 25 PERB 53044 (1992), rev'd on jurisdictional grounds. 198 A.D.2d 824, 26 PERB 57015 (4th Dep't 
1993) ; Onondacra-Cortland-Madison BOCES, 23 PERB 53014, at 3031 
n.8 (1990). 
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automatically become a ten-month position simply because teachers 
have the latter as their contractual work year. Although we do 
not consider the Director to have reached the merits of the 
employer's claim in this regard in Albany-Schoharie-Schenectady 
BOCES, to the extent anything in that decision is to the 
contrary, we simply disagree with that conclusion. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York 
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STATE OF MEW YORK 
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In the Matter of 
EASTCHESTER TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, NEW YORK 
STATE UNITED TEACHERS, 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Eastchester 
Union Free School District (District) to a decision on remand by 
the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Director), Pursuant to a petition filed in November 1993 by the 
Eastchester Teachers Association, New York State United Teachers 
(Association), the Director added teaching assistants to the 
Association's existing unit of professional employees. In his 
decision prior to remand,^ the Director reasoned that the 
teaching assistants should be added to the Association's unit 
because their one-time bargaining agent, the Eastchester Teaching 
Assistants (ETA), had "specifically disclaimed any 
representational interest . . . and [it] has apparently been 
dissolved." On the District's exceptions to that decision, we 
y21 PERB f4067 (1994). 
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ordered the case remanded27 because there "may have been some 
confusion regarding ETA's status and interests." The Director 
held a hearing on remand at which the only witness was Gail 
DelVecchio, the ETA representative who had written us, in 
conjunction with the first appeal, to deny that any ETA 
representative had ever specifically disclaimed a 
representational interest. On the basis of DelVecchio's 
testimony on remand, the Director concluded that the ETA had, in 
fact, disbanded in 1993 and is now defunct. Treating the 
teaching assistants as unrepresented, the Director concluded that 
they were most appropriately added to the Association's unit, 
reaffirming the result of his first decision. 
The District argues in its exceptions that the Director's 
findings are not supported by the record and that his decision is 
contrary to principles of law established in both Board and 
Director decisions. The Association, in response, argues that 
the Director's findings and conclusions are correct, consistent 
with precedent, and should be affirmed. 
Having reviewed the record and considered the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's decision. 
Certain issues on this appeal have been decided previously 
by us. First, we held recently, in Union-Endicott Central School 
District.^ that when a bargaining agent becomes defunct, the 
^28 PERB 53009 (1995). 
^28 PERB 53029 (1995)(appeal pending). 
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employees who were previously represented by that agent become 
unrepresented and their unit placement is effectively treated as 
a case of initial uniting. The fragmentation/consolidation cases 
cited by the District, therefore, have no application if the ETA 
is defunct. Second, we have held consistently that, in initial 
uniting situations, teaching assistants, as allied professional 
employees, are most appropriately grouped with teachers and other 
instructional personnel,^7 notwithstanding an existing disparity 
of benefits.^ 
Given the above two controlling principles, the issue in 
this case becomes a factual one: whether the record establishes 
that the ETA is defunct or, in the District's words, no longer a 
viable entity. 
The District argues that the record establishes, at most, 
that the ETA has only gone underground, lying dormant until the 
outcome of the unit determination in this case. It argues that 
if the teaching assistants are not added to the Association's 
unit, the ETA could be reactivated and it could continue to 
represent the teaching assistants as it had before in a separate 
unit. 
As noted, the record on this issue consists of DelVecchio's 
testimony. DelVecchio is admittedly not experienced in labor 
^See, e.g., Dutchess County BOCES. 25 PERB 53048 (1995) ; 
Onondaaa-Cortland-Madison BOCES. 23 PERB 53014 (1991). 
^Unateqo Cent. Sch. Dist.. 15 PERB 53097 (1982) (disparity of 
benefits disregarded among groups with shared professional 
community of interest). 
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relations and her testimony is, accordingly, often unclear or 
imprecise. We conclude, however, that the Director's decision 
reflects a fair and accurate reading of the material parts of the 
record. The ETA was viable until several of its members and 
representatives met with a representative of the Association to 
inquire as to whether their interests would be better served if 
they were represented by the Association in the teachers unit. 
The ETA members present at that meeting, including DelVecchio and 
the other representatives of the ETA, decided to pursue 
representation through the Association and they signed 
Association membership cards to that end. Accepting the advice 
of the Association's representative that continued negotiations 
through ETA would compromise their goal, and perhaps believing 
that they could not legally negotiate a collective bargaining 
agreement, the members of ETA ceased all organizational activity. 
No meetings of any kind for any purpose have been held by the ETA 
for more than two years. 
An employee organization exists for purposes of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) to negotiate and administer 
collective bargaining agreements. When an organization makes a 
clear and conscious decision to entirely stop representing 
employees with respect to their employment, it must be defunct 
for purposes of the Act. The District's representation that the 
ETA could at some later date become active is speculative at 
best. As DelVecchio herself noted, she could not even speak for 
others or the group if for no other reason than there has been a 
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change in circumstances and personnel over time. Therefore, even 
the very loose organizational structure the ETA once had has been 
lost. Moreover, the District would have us test viability by 
what might be, not by what was and is. What might be in the 
future under different circumstances cannot be the standard by 
which an organization's present viability is assessed. What was 
true when the petition was filed, and remains true to date, is 
that the ETA is nonfunctioning and its former members are 
currently unrepresented. Other than the fact that the union's 
abandonment of its unit was more formally conveyed to the 
employer in Union-Endicott Central School District than here, the 
material facts in this case are the same as there and warrant the 
same result. No formal communication to the District was 
necessary to establish or confirm a state apparent on the facts. 
Therefore, ETA's failure to "formally" convey to the District its 
abandonment of the unit is immaterial for purposes of this 
proceeding. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District's exceptions 
are denied and the Director's decision is affirmed. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Sidney 
Teachers Association (Association) to a decision by the Assistant 
Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation 
(Assistant Director) dismissing its charges against the Sidney 
Central School District (District). The Association alleges that 
the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally assigned to nonunit 
personnel certain job duties previously performed exclusively by 
employees within the Association's unit. The Assistant Director 
dismissed both charges because the Association had not complied 
with the notice of claim requirements in Education Law §3813. 
After the Assistant Director's decision, the Appellate 
Division, Third Department in Deposit Central School District v. 
CASE NOS.U-13923 
and U-14052 
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PERB.y (hereafter Deposit) made three holdings that are 
dispositive of the Association's exceptions. First, the Court 
held that the notice of claim provisions in Education Law §3813 
apply to all alleged violations of §209-a.l(d) of the Act. 
Second, the Court held that failure to satisfy the notice of 
claim requirements can be raised for the first time on appeal to 
us as the "court of original jurisdiction". Third, it held that 
the notice of claim provisions in Education Law §3813 are 
satisfied if the school district's governing body receives a copy 
of a sufficiently detailed improper practice charge within ninety 
days after the claims asserted therein arose. 
The Court's decision in Deposit requires that we deny the 
Association's exceptions, except insofar as it argues that 
Education Law §3813 has been satisfied, at least in part. The 
third listed holding in Deposit requires reversal of the 
Assistant Director's decision in U-13923 in part and in U-14052 
entirely. 
The claims in U-13923 arose in June and August of 1992 when, 
to the Association's knowledge, the duties of unit employees were 
allegedly transferred outside of its unit. The charge was filed 
on October 8, 1992, a copy of the charge was sent by mail to the 
y
 A.D.2d , 28 PERB J7013 (3d Dep't 1995). That Court 
first held that Education Law §3813 is applicable to at least 
some improper practice charges in Union-Endicott Cent. Sch. Dist. 
v. PERB. 197 A.D.2d 276, 27 PERB 57005 (3d Dep't 1994), motions 
for leave to appeal denied. 84 N.Y.2d 803, 27 PERB 57012 & 57013 
(1994). We have followed Union-Endicott despite our disagreement 
with its holding and rationale and apply Deposit similarly. 
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District by the Director of Public Employment Practices and 
Representation (Director) on October 20, 1992, and the District 
answered the charge on November 2, 1992. It is clear from these 
dates that the District did not receive a notice of claim 
regarding the June transfers of unit work within ninety days of 
the accrual of those claims.& Such notice would have had to 
have been presented to the District at the latest by mid-
September, but the charge was not even filed until October. The 
District, however, had timely notice of claim regarding the 
August 6, 7, 12 and 19 transfers of unit work. As to the August 
transfers of work, the District had before the end of the ninety-
day notice period actually received and answered the charge, 
which is sufficiently detailed under Deposit. 
The charge in U-14052 involves transfers of unit work which 
occurred during the summer of 1992. That charge was filed on 
November 20, 1992, and was sent to the District by the Director 
on December 1, 1992. In lieu of an answer, the District, 
pursuant to §204.3(b) of our Rules of Procedure, filed a motion 
for particularization of that charge on December 9, 1992. 
^The District's receipt of the improper practice charges is the 
only viable notice of claim it received in either of these cases. 
Grievances earlier filed by the Association did not provide the 
District with parallel notice because they were admittedly 
dissimilar to the allegations raised in the improper practice 
charges. Deposit necessarily rejects the Association's argument 
that only the demanded remedy controls the application of 
Education Law §3813 and the recognized exceptions thereto. The 
Assistant Director concluded, and we agree, that there is no 
occasion for us to consider whether under any circumstances a 
contractual grievance can constitute parallel notice of a claim 
of improper practice for Education Law §3813 purposes. 
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The Association alleges in U-14052 that it did not discover 
the transfers of unit work until certain dates in November 1992. 
If the claim is deemed to have accrued when the work was in fact 
transferred, the District clearly did not receive timely notice 
of claim under Deposit. Conversely, if the claim did not accrue 
until the Association learned of the transfers, then the District 
was in receipt of the requisite notice of claim because the 
charge as filed in U-14052 is sufficiently detailed.^ 
An improper practice claim does not accrue for purposes of 
Education Law §3813 until the charging party knew or should have 
known of the conduct constituting the alleged improper practice. 
The cases construing Education Law §3813 clearly support our 
conclusion that the claimant must have had actual or constructive 
knowledge of the grounds constituting a claim for the claim to 
have accrued within the meaning of that statute.^ Any other 
interpretation would have a charging party do the impossible: 
give notice of a claim it had no reason to know or believe it 
^The presiding Administrative Law Judge denied the District's 
motion for particularization because the charge as filed was 
reasonably clear. 
^Bd. of Educ. of Enlarged Qgdensburg City Sch. Dist. v. Wager 
Constr. Corp.. 37 N.Y.2d 283 (1975)(accrual when damages are 
ascertainable). Accord Almar Constr. Corp. v. P.M. Hughes & 
Sons. Inc.f 58 A.D.2d 615 (2d Dep't), appeal dismissed. 42 N.Y.2d 
1009 (1977). Pope v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 194 A.D.2d 
654 (2d Dep't), motion for leave to appeal dismissed. 82 N.Y.2d 
846 (1993)(claim accrued when claimant became aware of alleged 
contract breach). See also Chemical Constr. Corp. v. Bd. of 
Educ. of the City of New York. 105 Misc.2d 980 (Sup. Ct. Kings. 
Co. 1980)(claim does not accrue until claimant has reason to 
believe there is a claim). 
Board - U-13923 & U-14052 -5 
had. In light of Deposit. the Assistant Director's dismissal of 
U-14052 must be reversed and remanded for a determination as to 
when the Association first knew or should have known of the 
transfers of unit work involved in that case. Depending upon 
that determination, the District may or may not have received 
timely notice of claim under Deposit. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Assistant Director's 
decision in U-13923 is affirmed insofar as he dismissed that part 
of the charge concerning the June 1992 transfers of unit work and 
it is otherwise reversed. The Assistant Director's decision in 
U-14052 is reversed. The matters are hereby remanded for further 
processing and decision consistent with our decision herein. SO 
ORDERED. 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York 
aline R. Kinsella, tSKai Pau  airperson 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Odessa-
Montour Teachers Association (Association) to a decision by an 
Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). After a hearing, the A U 
dismissed the Association's charge against the Odessa-Montour 
Central School District (District), which alleges that the 
District violated §209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it transferred Phoebe 
Baker from her assignment as a first-grade teacher at B.C. Cate 
Elementary School to a sixth-grade assignment at its Hanlon 
School for the 1994-95 school year. The ALJ dismissed the 
§209-a.l(a) and (c) allegations finding no evidence that the 
District was aware of Baker's union-related activities, no 
evidence of any animus, and no evidence warranting a finding that 
anything other than legitimate educational reasons prompted the 
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District's decision to transfer her. The ALJ dismissed the 
§209-a.l(d) allegation because the transfer "practice" which the 
District allegedly failed to follow was embodied in a 1983 "TALC" 
agreement. ^  Finding that the TALC agreement was the 
Association's source of right regarding teacher transfers, and 
that the Association was claiming that Baker's transfer violated 
the terms of the TALC agreement, the ALJ dismissed the 
§209-a.l(d) allegation for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 
§205.5(d) of the Act.27 
The Association argues in its exceptions that the ALJ's 
findings and credibility determinations favoring the District's 
articulated educational reasons for Baker's transfer are not 
supported by the record and that the jurisdictional dismissal of 
the §209-a.l(d) allegation is incorrect because the TALC 
agreement is not an agreement within the meaning of the Act. The 
District in response argues that the ALJ's decision reflects 
correct findings and conclusions and should be affirmed. 
Having considered the parties' arguments, we affirm the 
ALJ's decision. Our review of the record affords us no basis on 
which to disturb either the ALJ's material findings of fact or 
his credibility resolutions, all of which are consistent with the 
^The parties' collective bargaining agreement creates a teacher 
administrative liaison committee (TALC). The District and 
Association representatives on that committee reached the 
agreement regarding teacher transfers. 
^That section of the Act divests us of jurisdiction over 
violations of extant agreements. 
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evidence in the record. Whether, as the Association argues, 
Baker's transfer was unfair, arbitrary or capricious is not for 
us to decide. Our inquiry under the §209-a.l(a) and (c) 
allegations ends with the conclusion that Baker was not 
transferred because of her union status or activities. 
The ALJ's jurisdictional dismissal of the §209-a.l(d) 
allegation is also correct. The Association itself argues that 
the District had honored the TALC agreement until it transferred 
Baker. Both parties concede that the TALC agreement is in 
effect, disagreeing only as to its meaning and application in 
this instance. The Association continues to argue that Baker's 
transfer violated the TALC agreement. The Association's 
arguments are simply not consistent with its assertion that the 
TALC agreement is not an agreement for purposes of the Act. An 
agreement for purposes of the Act is merely an exchange of 
promises, without regard to form, between an employer and union, 
in this case one made through agents of each on the TALC 
committee.^ Whether Baker's transfer violated that TALC 
agreement is an issue which is not properly before us under 
§205.5(d) of the Act. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Association's 
exceptions are denied and the ALJ's decision is affirmed. 
^Act §201.12. Both unions and employers clearly may, and often 
do, negotiate through designated agents. State of New York -
Unified Court System, 28 PERB 53012 (1995)(appeal pending). 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that the charge must be, and it 
hereby is, dismissed. 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by the Sidney 
Teachers Association, NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO (Association) to a 
decision by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on a charge against 
the Sidney Central School District (District). The Association 
alleges that the District violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) when it unilaterally changed 
its release time practice by requiring unit employees to charge 
their leave accruals when attending PERB proceedings. The ALJ 
dismissed the charge because the Association had not presented 
the District with a notice of claim pursuant to Education Law 
§3813. 
We reverse the ALJ's decision on the basis of the Appellate 
Division, Third Department's recent decision in Deposit Central 
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School District v. PERB (hereafter Deposit) .^ In Deposit, 
decided November 2, 1995, following issuance of the ALJ's 
decision, the Court held, inter alia, that the notice of claim 
provisions of Education Law §3813 are satisfied if the school 
district's governing body receives a copy of a sufficiently 
detailed improper practice charge within ninety days after the 
claim or claims asserted therein arose. The claims here arose at 
the earliest on March 14 and 25, 1994 when requests for paid 
leave were denied. The District answered the charge on April 29, 
1994, thereby establishing its receipt of the charge within 
ninety days of the dates of accrual of the claims asserted 
therein. The improper practice charge in this case is as 
detailed as the one in Deposit regarding the nature of the claims 
and the time, place and manner in which they arose. On the basis 
of the Court's holding and rationale in Deposit, the Education 
Law §3813 notice requirements have been satisfied. 
For the reasons set forth above, the ALJ's decision is 
reversed and the case is remanded to the ALJ for further 
processing consistent with this decision. SO ORDERED. 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York 
[uJL^  L M^|k 
Pauline R. Kinsella, Chairperson 
Eric J<" Schmertz, MembjkiT 
17
 A.D.2d , 28 PERB 57013 (3d Dep't 1995). For further 
discussion of Deposit see Sidney Cent. Sch. Dist.. 28 PERB 53066 
(1995), also decided this date and involving these same parties. 
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BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions filed by Rockland 
Professional Management (RPM) and cross-exceptions filed by the 
County of Rockland (County) to a decision of the Director of 
Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director). The 
Director held after a hearing that certain unrepresented 
employees of the County sought to be represented by RPM^ are 
^RPM sought a unit which would include the following titles: 
Deputy Public Defender, Assistant Public Defender(F/T), Assistant 
Public Defender(P/T), Attorney III (Labor), Attorney III 
(Municipal Affairs), Attorney II, Attorney I, Counsel (Health 
Department), Assistant County Attorney (P/T), Construction 
Representative, Deputy County Clerk, Second Deputy County Clerk, 
County Insurance Coordinator, Coordinator of the Traffic Safety 
Program, Second Deputy Commissioner of Social Services, Director 
of County Veterans Services Agency, Engineer V, Engineer IV 
(Hydraulics), Second Deputy Commissioner of Hospitals, and 
Patient Services Administrator. 
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not entitled to representation in any unit because they are, as 
alleged by the County, managerial and/or confidential within the 
meaning of §201.7(a) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment 
Act (Act) and that the remaining titles sought by RPM are most 
appropriately placed in a unit of professional and supervisory 
employees of the County, which is currently represented by the 
Rockland Association of Management, NYSUT, AFT, Local 4404, AFL-
CIO (RAM) .2/ Although RAM was notified of the pendency of the 
petition, it did not intervene or participate in the Director's 
investigation. 
RPM excepts to the Director's determination that the 
Attorney III (Labor) and the Attorney III (Municipal Affairs) 
are not entitled to representation under the Act because they 
are confidential employees on the ground that there is 
insufficient evidence in the record to support the Director's 
determination. It otherwise supports the Director's decision. 
The County alleges in its cross-exceptions that, in placing 
certain titles into RAM's unit, the Director ignored the 
Rockland County civil service rules, which classify the titles 
as "confidential", and also that he disregarded the language in 
the collective bargaining agreement between the County and RAM 
excluding certain positions from RAM's existing unit. It 
further alleges that the inclusion in RAM's unit of the 
2/The decision of the Director, at 28 PERB 54033 (1995), sets 
forth the precise definition of the RAM unit. 
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Assistant County Attorney (P/T), County Insurance Coordinator, 
Director of the Veterans Service Agency, Counsel (Health 
Department), Attorney II, Attorney I, Deputy Public Defender, 
Deputy County Clerk (First Deputy), and Coordinator of the 
Traffic Safety Program is not supported by the facts in the 
record. In its response to the County's exceptions, RPM 
challenges the factual and legal basis for those exceptions. 
The County likewise responded to RPM's exceptions. 
Based upon our review of the record and the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the Director's decision, in part, and 
remand, in part. 
Section 201.7(a) of the Act defines public employees "as 
any person holding a position by appointment or employment in 
the service of a public employer". The definition is inclusive, 
covering all public employees as defined and presumes a right of 
representation in the appropriate unit for all, except those few 
who are specifically excluded (e.g., judges and justices of the 
unified court system and members of the organized militia) and 
those who satisfy the criteria for designation as managerial or 
confidential.5/ Certain managerial and confidential employees 
were excluded from bargaining units in early initial uniting 
cases.y It was not until 1971, however, that the Legislature 
amended the Act to specifically provide for the exclusion of 
^State of New York fSUNY). 24 PERB f3035 (1991). 
^See New York State, Division of State Police. 1 PERB 5399.32 
(1968) . 
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managerial and confidential employees as defined. In adopting 
this exclusionary language, the Legislature noted: 
It is the intention of the legislature that 
designations of employees as management or 
confidential... reflect the extent to which a public 
employer has from time to time organized itself for 
collective negotiations. It is not the intention of 
the legislature to destroy existing employer-employee 
negotiating units.... Nor is it the intention of the 
legislature to impede, impair or otherwise interfere 
with the exercise of rights of organization and 
representation of public employees... who do not 
formulate policy or who do not have a significant role 
in employee relations....^ 
In one of the first cases decided after the enactment of this 
legislative policy statement, the Board reiterated the 
Legislature's caution that employees should not be excluded from 
bargaining units except in a very clear instance of the exercise 
of managerial or confidential responsibilities, noting that "all 
uncertainties should be resolved in favor of Taylor Law 
coverage."^ It is for a public employer to seek the 
designation of such employees and their removal from coverage 
under the Act.^ Likewise, in the context of a petition 
seeking the representation of unrepresented employees, it is for 
the employer to present evidence which supports the finding that 
employees with managerial or confidential job duties be excluded 
from the appropriate unit. 
^L. 1971, c. 503, as amended by L. 1971, c. 504 and L. 1975, 
c. 854. 
^State of New York. 5 PERB 53001, at 3004 (1972). 
^Rules of Procedure, §201.10. 
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In determining whether a public employee should be deprived 
of representation rights, in either the context of a 
managerial/confidential application or a representation 
petition, we are controlled by the criteria set forth in the 
Act,**7 as interpreted and applied in our decisions: 
The first criterion for managerial designation is 
"Policy formulation". An employee who either 
individually selects from among options those which 
are to be the objectives of a public employer in 
fulfilling its mission, and the methods and extent of 
meeting those objectives, or who regularly 
participates in the essential process resulting in 
such decisions, formulates policy within the meaning 
of the Act. A person who participates in that process 
in a clerical or advisory role or as a resource person 
does not satisfy that criterion. 
To satisfy the second criterion, participation in 
collective negotiations, an employee must be a direct 
participant in the preparation of the employer's 
proposals and positions in collective negotiations and 
an active participant in the negotiating process 
itself. Acting as an observer or resource person 
either at the table or in caucuses is insufficient. 
To satisfy the third criterion an employee must 
have a major role in the administration of agreements, 
beyond that of a routine or clerical nature. He must 
have the authority to exercise independent judgment in 
effecting changes in the employer's procedures or 
methods of operation as necessitated by the 
implementation of agreements. Participation in the 
first level of the contract grievance procedures does 
not meet this criterion. 
The fourth criterion, exercising a major role in 
personnel administration, requires that an employee 
exercise independent judgment and fundamental control 
over the direction and scope of the employer's 
mission. A first step grievance role or the authority 
to hire or recommend the retention of employees could 
indicate supervision but would not satisfy this 
criterion. 
^Act, §201.7(a)(i) & (ii). 
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With respect to the foregoing, even those 
employees occupying what may fairly be termed a high-
level supervisory role, do not necessarily fall within 
the "managerial" definition. (Footnote omitted) 
To be designated confidential, an employee must 
act in a confidential capacity to another employee who 
satisfies any of the latter three managerial criteria 
or be privy to labor relations information not 
intended for the eyes and ears of unit members or 
their representatives. (Footnote omitted)27 
In this case, the Director determined that the current 
Attorney III (Labor) is a confidential employee on the basis of 
his involvement in labor relations on behalf of the County. The 
current incumbent is no longer involved in contract 
negotiations, but he is the County's representative in all 
disciplinary proceedings, prosecuting Civil Service Law §75 
charges on behalf of the County and appearing for the County in 
all cases before PERB and related court actions. On this basis 
alone, his exclusion is necessary because he is exposed to 
information not appropriate for the eyes and ears of unit 
members or their representatives.—7 RPM argues, however, that 
only a small number of disciplinary charges flow from the RAM 
unit and that the Attorney III (Labor) has never exhibited any 
disloyalty to the County in his handling of labor relations 
matters. As to the first argument, the exclusion is based not 
only on the attorney's exposure to labor relations information 
^Citv of Binahamton. 12 PERB 54022, at 4035, aff'd. 12 PERB 
13099 (1979). 
^Nassau County BOCES. 10 PERB 14071 (1977), aff'd. 11 PERB 53032 
(1978). 
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involving RAM but the County's labor relations work with all of 
the eleven units of County employees, for which he is almost 
solely responsible.H/ As to the second argument, the absence 
of a demonstrated disloyalty to the County is not a basis upon 
which to conclude that a managerial or confidential position, 
excluded from the Act's coverage, is nonetheless appropriately 
placed in a bargaining unit. 
The Director also excluded the Attorney III (Municipal 
Affairs) from representation due to his exposure to confidential 
information about the County's financial operations. The record 
reflects that the current incumbent serves as counsel to the 
County Attorney on legislation, ethics and conflict of law and 
also as counsel to the County Legislature's Budget and Finance 
Committee, which handles the County appropriations issues. He 
attends most meetings of that committee, rendering legal 
opinions to it on a variety of matters. As such, he is exposed 
to the County's fiscal information and discussions on the 
County's financial situation and proposed actions. Clearly, 
such exposure to the County's financial information supports the 
Director's determination that the Attorney III (Municipal 
Affairs) is not entitled to inclusion in a negotiating unit. 
The County excepts to the Director's decision because he 
did not defer to the County's civil service rules, which 
designate all Assistant County Attorneys, the County Insurance 
i^See Niaaara-Wheatfield Cent. Sch. Dist.. 11 PERB 54044 (1979). 
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Coordinator and the Director of the Veteran Service Agency as 
confidential. However, the explanation given to those rules by 
a memorandum from the County Commissioner of Personnel makes 
clear that the civil service rules, in referring to the 
designation of individuals as confidential, do not utilize the 
criteria set forth in §201.7(a) of the Act.^7 In any event, 
whether an employee is managerial or confidential within the 
meaning of the Act is a determination resting within PERB's 
jurisdiction exclusively. Although in determining managerial or 
confidential status, we look to job descriptions, civil service 
job specifications, the duties actually performed, and the 
public employer's placement, or nonplacement, of the title in a 
unit of represented employees, the employer's designation is not 
dispositive, especially when the employer does not base its 
placement on the Act's definition of a confidential employee. 
The County also argues that the Director erred by placing 
several of the titles into the unit represented by RAM because 
the contract between the County and RAM specifically excludes 
the officer or head of each office, department or agency who has 
the power to appoint or the chief executive or director of each 
^In a memorandum to department heads, school district officials 
and town and village officials within the County, the 
Commissioner specifically states: "[Y]ou should be aware that 
the various criteria flowing from the Taylor Law and the 
determinations of PERB with respect to managerial/confidential 
designations are not those to be used for this determination. 
The Taylor Law definitions are more strictly defined than the 
ones used here to determine whether a position should be 
exempt...." 
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department, office or agency, certain assistant county attorneys 
and public defenders. It asserts that the County and RAM have 
the right to determine the appropriate scope of RAM's bargaining 
unit without question, investigation or interference by PERB. 
Although public employers and employee organizations are 
encouraged to agree upon the composition of bargaining units, as 
well as the terms and conditions of employment of unit 
employees, when a representation dispute arises, PERB has the 
statutory duty, pursuant to §207 of the Act, to determine the 
most appropriate bargaining unit consistent with the criteria 
contained therein. Agreements between the employer and the 
employee organization regarding unit inclusions and exclusions 
are, accordingly, not controlling.^/ 
The County also excepts to the Director's determination 
that the employees in the following several titles are entitled 
to representation. 
Initially, we note that assistant attorneys general and 
assistant district attorneys are the only attorney titles which 
are specifically designated in the Act as managerial employees 
and excluded from representation under the Act.^ The 
representation rights of all other attorneys in public 
employment must be assessed on the basis of the duties they 
actually, or could reasonably be expected to, perform. 
13/See State of New York. 1 PERB 1399.85 (1968). 
^Act, §201.7(b). 
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The County asserts that the Deputy Public Defender is a 
policy maker and, therefore, should be excluded from coverage 
under the Act. The Director found that this title is 
responsible for supervision of the Assistant Public Defenders 
and may act in the place of the Public Defender when he is not 
available, but that it does not have any policy-making or any 
labor relations responsibilities. As a result, the position is 
not disqualified from inclusion in a bargaining unit. The 
record supports the Director's determination.^ 
The County also challenges the Director's determination 
that the Attorney II and Attorney I are eligible for inclusion 
in a bargaining unit.^ The record shows that although the 
Attorney II, who heads the debt collection task force within the 
County Attorney's office,^ has some supervisory 
responsibilities over secretarial and para-professional staff, 
he has no labor relations responsibilities. While the Attorney 
II exercises some independent judgment with respect to 
accomplishing the work of the debt collection task force, the 
record does not establish that he is responsible for setting or 
significantly influencing policy, which would warrant a 
^Indeed, the County legislation which created the position in 
1994 specifically states that "this legislature deems the 
position created herein not to be a policy making position." 
•^The Attorney I promotes to Attorney II, which promotes to 
Attorney III or Counsel (Health Department). 
^The other Attorney II title is located in the social services 
department and is already included in the RAM unit. 
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conclusion that he is a managerial employee.-^ That he may 
assist those who formulate policy is not a basis for determining 
that he is a confidential employee. An employee is confidential 
for purposes of the Act only when assisting in a confidential 
capacity a managerial employee who exercises labor relations 
responsibilities and, thus, has access to information regarding 
contract negotiations, contract administration or personnel 
administration.^ 
The Attorney I title is assigned by the County Attorney to 
provide legal assistance to the County's Department of Mental 
Health. Although the incumbent acts as legal advisor to the 
Department and to the County Legislature's multi-service 
committee, his recommendations to those bodies are reviewed and 
approved by the County Attorney. He may also exercise some 
degree of independent judgment in the cases in which he 
represents the department. The Director found, and we agree, 
that he does not make policy and he is not responsible for any 
negotiations or personnel or contract administration which would 
otherwise warrant his exclusion from the bargaining unit. 
There are three Assistant County Attorneys (P/T) in the 
County Attorney's office, all of whom the Director found were 
•^In Binahamton Citv Sch. Dist.. 8 PERB 53084, at 3146 (1975), 
policy was defined as "the development of the particular 
objectives in the fulfillment of the employer's mission and of 
the methods, means and extent of achieving such objectives", 
citing to State of New York. 5 PERB 53001, at 3005 (1972). 
^Act, §201.7 (a). 
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entitled to representation. They are responsible for giving 
advice in the areas of solid waste, sewer districts and 
highways. While they assist the County Attorney and the 
departments responsible for their respective areas of expertise 
in formulating policy, they have no major role in policy 
formulation. As noted above, assisting a managerial employee in 
the formulation of the employer's policy is insufficient to 
warrant a designation as managerial or confidential under the 
Act and, therefore, to deprive an employee of representation 
rights. 22/ 
The Deputy County Clerk (First Deputy) may assume the 
responsibilities of the County Clerk when he is away or unable 
to perform the duties of his office, although there is no record 
evidence that the Deputy has ever done so. The Deputy Clerk 
supervises fifteen employees in the land records area of the 
County Clerk's office and hears grievances as their immediate 
supervisor under the contractual grievance procedure. The 
County Clerk may consult him, as well as the second deputy, the 
administrative assistant and other department heads about the 
preparation of the department budget and the hiring of new 
employees. The County points to these responsibilities as 
warranting a conclusion that this position should be excluded 
from the bargaining unit as a managerial or confidential 
^There is a fourth Assistant County Attorney (P/T) position with 
labor relations responsibilities which is currently vacant. It 
was not included in RPM's petition and its unit placement is, 
therefore, not addressed by this decision. 
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position. The Director determined that, as the position had no 
policy-making responsibilities and did not act in a confidential 
capacity, it was eligible for inclusion in RAM's unit. We agree 
with the Director's rationale. Although a high-level 
supervisor, the Deputy County Clerk is a resource person who 
serves in an advisory role to the County Clerk and has only a 
ministerial role in the administration of the collective 
bargaining agreement covering the employees he supervises. 
The County excepts to the inclusion of the Counsel (Health 
Department) in RAM's bargaining unit, arguing that it is 
managerial or confidential. It appears from the record that the 
Counsel works out of the County Attorney's office but reports to 
the Commissioner of Health. His job description lists a wide 
range of responsibilities, including giving legal advice to the 
Commissioner, the Medical Examiner's Division and the County 
Legislature's multi-service committee, acting as the 
Commissioner's representative at certain administrative 
hearings, reviewing County rules, regulations and guidelines to 
ensure compliance with State and federal guidelines, reviewing 
contracts with the County's insurance carriers, and advising 
Board of Health hearing officers in enforcement actions. 
However, these duties are not fully explained on the record. 
Therefore, we are unable to determine whether the Counsel's job 
duties constitute the kind of direct and powerful influence on 
policy formulation which would warrant exclusion from the Act's 
coverage. The case must, therefore, be remanded to the Director 
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to take further evidence as to the duties actually performed by 
the Counsel (Health Department). 
The County excepts also to the Director's determination 
that the County Insurance Coordinator, Director of the Veterans 
Services Agency and Traffic Safety Coordinator should be 
afforded representation rights within RAM's unit. 
The Coordinator of the Traffic Safety Program reports 
directly to the County Executive and supervises a small office 
staff. The record reflects that she is involved in policy 
formulation "to a certain degree" in that she reviews and 
evaluates current and future County policies with respect to 
traffic safety, applies for grants and makes recommendations to 
the County Executive. We find, as did the Director, that this 
position acts as an office head and the incumbent is a high-
level supervisor with a great degree of technical skill, who, 
nevertheless does not 
participate with regularity in the essential process 
involving the determination of the goals and 
objectives of the government involved, and of the 
methods for accomplishing those goals and objectives 
that have a substantial impact upon the affairs and 
the constituency of the government. The formulation 
of policy does not extend to the determination of 
methods of operation that are merely of a technical 
nature. 21/ 
21/Town of Greece, 27 PERB f3024, at 3059 (1994). 
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The position of Coordinator of Traffic Safety Programs is, 
therefore, appropriately placed in the RAM unit. 
The Insurance Coordinator is involved in the selection of 
insurance carriers and the settlement of insurance claims for 
the County, but it does not appear that he is the final decision 
maker, as the County Executive must approve any resolution of 
claims and the County Legislature must pass a resolution. He 
makes recommendations to the County Executive and the County 
Legislature on insurance matters, but he is only one of several 
advisors, including the attorneys employed by the County. He 
has supervisory responsibility over a small staff, including the 
ability to hire, fire and discipline.227 
The Director of the Veterans Services Agency also reports 
directly to the County Executive and makes recommendations to 
him about the County's policies toward veterans. Like the 
Insurance Coordinator, his recommendations are reviewed by the 
County Executive and may be followed, modified or ignored. He, 
too, supervises a small staff, apparently with the power to 
hire, fire and discipline. While he makes some policy 
recommendations, it is unclear whether he has independent 
authority to implement those policies without prior approval by 
the County Executive. 
^The County alleges in its exceptions that, since the close of 
the record in this case, a new incumbent has been hired with 
additional duties and responsibilities, evidence of which it 
would present on remand. 
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There is very little in the record, beyond their job 
descriptions, upon which to base a determination as to the 
managerial status of the County Insurance Coordinator and the 
Director of the Veterans Service Agency. Since we will not 
deprive employees of representation rights solely on the basis 
of a job description, the case must be remanded to the Director 
for evidence concerning the duties of the Insurance Coordinator 
and the Director of Veterans Services as actually performed. 
Neither party has taken any exception to the Director's 
determination that a new unit of middle management employees 
represented by RPM is not most appropriate because such a unit 
already exists and is represented by RAM. RAM has not 
intervened in the proceeding and it has not filed any objections 
to the Director's placement of the at-issue employees in its 
unit. We, therefore, do not find any basis to disturb this 
aspect of the Director's decision. 
For the reasons set forth above, the Director's decision is 
affirmed in part and remanded in part, for further processing 
consistent with our decision herein regarding the Counsel 
(Health Department), County Insurance Coordinator and the 
Director of the Veterans Services Agency. 
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IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that, in addition to the titles 
which were placed into RAM's unit pursuant to the Director's 
decision and which were not the subject of the exceptions or 
cross-exceptions, the following titles be and are added to the 
unit represented by RAM: 
Coordinator of the Traffic Safety Program 
Deputy Public Defender 
Deputy County Clerk 
Attorney II 
Attorney I 
Assistant County Attorney (P/T)2^ 
DATED: November 29, 1995 
Albany, New York 
^No election is necessary as the addition of these titles to 
RAM's unit constitutes only a de minimis change which does not 
affect RAM's majority status. New York Convention Center 
Operating Corp.. 27 PERB fl3034 (1994). 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
BROOME COUNTY SHERIFF'S LAW ENFORCEMENT 
OFFICERS ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-443 8 
THE COUNTY OF BROOME and BROOME COUNTY 
SHERIFF, 
Employer, 
-and-
BROOME COUNTY DEPUTY SHERIFF'S LOCAL 
2012, COUNCIL 82, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
Intervenor. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board 'in 
accordance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public 
Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the Broome County Sheriff's Law 
Enforcement Officers Association has been designated and selected 
by a majority of the employees of the above-named public 
employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties and described 
Certification - C-4438 - 2 -
below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of 
collective negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: Deputy sheriff; deputy sheriff sergeant; deputy 
sheriff lieutenant; deputy sheriff detective; 
and deputy sheriff detective sergeant. 
Excluded: . ..All other ...employees.of. Sheriff's Department. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with the Broome County Sheriff's Law 
Enforcement Officers Association. The duty to negotiate 
collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of 
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and the 
execution of a written agreement incorporating any agreement 
reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not 
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making 
of a concession. 
DATED: November 2 9, 1995 
Albany, New York 

